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Burnett: John Dewey and the ploys of revisionism

Revisionism is really a proponent of the structural status
quo.

John Dewey
and the ploys of revisionism

proponent of the structural status quo would be one or
more of a number of things. One of these would be to
show that his theoretical philosophy openly advocated the
structural status quo. Another would be to show that the
philosophy was so inconsistent or ambiguous that it
could be used to almost any purpose. Still another would
be that Dewey consistently took positions on practical
issues which supported the structural status quo, even if
his theory apparently required that he would act other·
wise.
Now I think Dewey's theory is under attack on all
three grounds; but, I further think that the revisionists are
not aware that they s hould keep the attacks separate, for
the attacks require different sorts of evidence and argu·
ment.
It is easy (but probably wrong), for instance, to view a
few specific practices of Dewey, conclude that his theory
must necessarily justify such practices, anct then con·
demn his theory. Or, it is easy (but wrong) to become im·
patient with the scholarship necessary to fully grasp
Dewey's socio-political philosophy, and "force" a ren·
daring of it which leads to faulty interpretations of these
practices.
Herein I concentrate particularly, but not exclusively,
on what it is necessary for a revisionist to take into ac·
count i f he is to succeed in showing that Dewey's social
and political philosophy or theory supports or even lends
itself to corporate, elitist centralism. I do not think the
revisionist can succeed, but let us look at the case.
A Case in Revisionism

By Joe R. Burnett

This article discusses some of the ploys wh ich might
be used for arguing that John Dewey's social and political
philosophy can be interpreted as an instance of needed
revisionism in American thOught.
What is meant, fi rst of all, by "revisionism?" What I
shall take It to mean is the modern tendency to reinterpret
so-called liberal thinkers of roughly the first half of this
century to show that they were In theory and/or practice
illiberal. Specifically this would mean one or more of the
following: that, while purporting or seeming to do other·
wise,

/

(1) their work did not support any major structural
shifts in the corporate democrac)pvhich prevailed
during that time (and, indeed, this time);
(2) they supported an elitism, if yet not the traditional
one; and/or
(3) they supported centralist social control of the
great bulk of Americans-in short, they supported
a formal or informal, centralized oligarchy.
Dewey was the nation's major liberal ph ilosopher
during the period, and he probably had the greatest in·
tellectual influence of any liberal thinker. He is a tempting
target for revisionists.
What it would take to show that' Dewey really was a
2

Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

Why might a revis ionist think he could succeed? If
the critic approaches Dewey's philosophy with the idea
that a political theory is basic to Dewey's or anyone' s
social philosophy, he might think so. Dewey's political
philosophy, his theory of the forms of political power, will
certainty appear wish}"'washy if that i s all one looks to.
With few exceptions, Dewey rooted his political theory In
a social theory of democracy. This Is evident, although the
reasons for it are not yet fully clear, in his early and middle
works. There is, for Instance, the classic passage in De·
mocracy and Education, In which he gives us the t wo crite·
ria which he says can be "extracted" from instances of
community:
Now in any social group whatever .. . we find
some interest in common, and we find a certain
amount of Interaction and cooperative in·
tercourse with other groups. From these two
traits we derive our s tandard. How numerous
and varied are the interests which are con·
sciousty shared? How full and free is the In·
terplay with other forms of association?'
Many student newcomers-but not only they, ap·
parently-to Dewey's thought sense a major problem
here: they notice that the criteria do not specify majority
rule, a canon of democratic political thought. Dewey him·
self says that " ... democracy is more than a form of
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of
conjoint communicated living."' And this makes it fair to
ask if there cannot be modes of democratic community or
associated living which do not abide by majority rule.
There obviously could be for Dewey; e.g., the family with
parents dominant, the extended community and neigh·
borhood with elders dominant, occupational and profes·
sional groupings with knowledgeable and skilled crafts·
people dominant. These ordinarily are not examples of
EOUCA TIONAL CONSIOERA TIONS, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter, HIBO
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wise would allow his philosophy to become a too l of what
properly is called on occasion, "the tyranny of the
majority." The more important thing i s what comes before
and after a vote:
.. . antecedent debates, modificati ons of views
to meet the opinions of minori ties, the relative
satisfacti on given the latter by the fact that it
has had a chance and that next time it may be
successful in becoming a majority .•
In a word, what is more important than majori ty vote and
majority rule i s commun ity before the fact of them and
community afterwards!
The emphasis upon, or de·emphasis of, majority rule
and representative government as forms o f democracy,
then, hardly suffices to question the centrality of the
democratic notion in Dewey' s philosophy.'
What then of his emphasis upon science, the in·
stitution and sc ientists? Do they represent a meritocratic
class whic h merely is to substitu te for the businessmen·
industrialist
s in a nonetheless centralized , corporate soci·
ety? The question and its answers are so important to
Dewey's social ph ilosophy that I shall not apologize for
quoting at length. In his disc ussion of an ideal society,
wh ich he referred to as the "Great Comm unity," he did not
foresee corporateness or centralization whic h could (I.e.,
should) dictate life in decentralized communities. The
Great Comm unity, he said,
... can never possess all the qualit
ies which
mark a local community. It will do its final work
i ons and enri ching the ex·
in ordering the relat
perience of local associations. The invasion
and partial destruction of the life of the latter
by outside uncontrolled agencies is the im ·
, dislntegra
·
mediate source o f the instability
tion and restlessness which characterize the
present epoch.'
And, indeed, he traced part of the problem precisel y to ex ·
perts:
No government by experts in which the masses
z
do not have the chance to inform the experts
as to thei r needs can be anything but an oligar·
chy managed in the interests of the few ....
The world has suffered more from leaders and
!expert] authorities than from the masses.•
Or again:
Rule by an economic c lass may be d isguised
from the masses; rule by experts coul d not be
covered up. It could be made to work only if the
intellectuals became the willing tools of big
economic interests. Otherwise they would
have to ally themselves with the masses, and
that implies, once more, a share in government
by the latter.••
Or, still again: "A class of experts is inevitably so removed
from common interests as to become a c lass with pri vate
interests and private knowledge, which in social matters
is not knowledge at all.""
Th is should put to rest the Idea that Dewey favored a
centralized form of interventionist, governmental control.
It s hould put to rest the idea o f corporate democracy. It
should put to rest the idea of a meritocracy of experis or
technocratic m eritocracy.
The fi nal part of this ploy, Dewey's occasional failure
to qualify himsel f about the func tion of citizen deter·
mination of rulers and " rules" is easy enough to dismiss

majority rule, but they can, if and w hen they are consistent
with the criteria, be examples of democratic community.
The c riteria simply are technically non-specific about po· l
litica forms.
If again, one is looking for political forms or power
syst em s as basic, it equally can be noted that the political
form o f representative government is not explic i tly sanc·
tloned. Obviously the criteria demand participation and
openness, but the f orm is left unspecified.
A third thing can mislead the unwary, and that Is
Dewey's heavy emphasis upon inquiry, the method of in·
telligence, and science. Not infrequently Dewey speaks of
the mission o f science as being almost necessarily central to recons tructing a disintegrating American society. It
is easy, and I think on a few occasions, warranted, to in·
terpret him as meaning by "science" the body of scien·
tists and/or the social institution of science. If one makes
this leap, and it is a leap in the context of the corpus of his
writing, it seems easy to conclude that Dewey is ad·
vocating a scientific meritocracy.
There is another possible source for the view that
" did not countenance more than a mod· m
Dewey " really
lcu of participatory democracy. He sometimes speaks of
the role of the citizen in a manner which seems curious ly
unqualified t o the ardent democrat. Thus, he writes !hat:
The devotion of democracy to education is a
n
is that
fam iliar fact. The superficial explanatio
a government resting upon popular suffrage
can not be successful unless those who elect
and who obey their governors are educated.
Since a democratic society repudiat es the prin·
c iple of external authority, It must find a s ub·
s titute in voluntary disposition and interest;
these can be created only by education. '
"laissez Fa ire Liberalism"
These, I thi nk, are the major ploys which can be used
to argue that Dewey's theory really is not democratic in
any new sense, but s imply ano ther rendering of classic,
- t
his time with liberal intellectua
ls
laisse faire liberalism
replacing, as the elite, the captains of industry and the
o ther traditional socio ·political interest groups of corporate democracy.
These arguments do not in fact "connect" with
Dewey's theory, however. Perhaps the most striking way
of showing this is by giving hi s arg uments agains t making
absolute such political devices as majority rule and representative government.
About the latter, Dewey maintains that it suggests or
" contains about all that is relevant t o political democ·
racy."• But he views this political notion as having arisen
out of the push and pull of people seeking immediate re·
dress of felt wrongs or needs, rather than some cosmic
sense of justice. The ethical defense o f the notion lies ra·
ther in its use, under proper c ircumstances, for obtaining
the quality and fact of com munity.'
The argument which is relevant in the case o f rep·
resentatlve government is most s uccinctly and c learly
made by Dewey in the allied case of majority rule. It, like
representative government, is one of the things he refers
to as a political form of democracy, which was devised at a
particular time in history to protect the values of com·
munity. He refuses to make it anything more than that, an
his torical provision, for fear that It, rather than what it is to
protect, will become the important object. To do other·
Winter. 1980
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as important in his total writings. Generally the qualification of necessary c itizen control is presenl if one will but
pursue the discussion. In the instance c ited earlier,
wherein Dewey speaks of those " who obey their gover·
nors," one finds the qualification eventually forthcoming:
It is the aim of progressive education to take
part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair
deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever
social control means subordination to c lass
authority, there is danger that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the
status quo. 12

And, speaking of c itizenship, he says there is a required
" ... abil ity to judge men and measures wisely and to take
a determining part in making as well as obeying laws."
Even stronger statements can be found, although
perhaps few in Democracy and Education. But, if we turn
to his greatest work on social and polit ical philosophy, we
read that,
... the current has set steadily in o ne direction : toward democratic forms. That government exists to serve its community, and that
this cannot be achieved unless the community
itself shares in selecting i!S governors and
determining their policies is a deposit of fact
left, as far as we can see, permanently in the
wake of doctrines and forms, however transitory the latter. They are nol the whole of lhe
democratic idea, but they express it in Its
political phase.... We have every reason to
think that whatever changes may take place in
existing democratic machinery, they will be of
a sort to make the interest of the public a more
supreme guide and criterion of governmental
activity, and to enable the public to form and
manifest its purposes still more authoritatively."
This discussion of the ploy of attacking Dewey's so·
cial and polit ical theory of democracy should not con ·
elude without emphasizing the point of departure w hich
makes it mainly possible. I take that to be an erroneous
construal of the political aspect of Dewey's thought to
primarily inform the social aspect. It works just the opposite for Dewey. The social concept of democracy is a
necessary determinant of the political. Ullimately Dewey
has his eye on the qualities of community associations
i.vhich can meet the tvJo criteria \•1hich .were cited. Such

qualities are not forms of democracy, they are the facts of
democracy. As he says,
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose con·
sequences are appreciated as good by all
singular persons who take part in it, and where
the realization of the good is such as to effect
an energetic desire and effort to sustain it In
being just because it Is a good shared by all,
there is in so far a community. This c lear consciousness of a communal life, In all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. ' 3
The political problem is to determine how, upon given
occasions of difficulty, to effect this fact and consciousness.
Finally, before shifting the analysis, one should recur
to the notion of inqu iry or method of intelligence. A con4
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dition for democracy in his (and, one is sure, our) time was
widely diffused abi lity to be critically intelligent. The
public requires this to rule itself
,
to select
,
inform, and
judge thOse who will represent it. This is a necessity of the
age, heavily determ ined by science, technology, and
technolog
ial ical-industr innovation. And, in this connection, one can say that it is a condition of the one form of
democracy which does seem to be implicit In the social
theory of democracy; viz., participatory democracy. To
th is point we will return.
Discussion Relevant to Literature
As part of this paper, I want to criticize one particular
analysis of Dewey's thought, partly to show that the above
discussion is relevant to the current literature, and partly
to show that one need not expect the three types of ploys
to be so neatly isolated as my initial statement might unintentionally have suggested.
The particular analysis is found in Walter Feinberg's,
Reason and Rhetoric. Dewey is treated as one, although
perhaps the c entral, figure in arguing a revisionist case;
and, it is solely upon hi s analysis of Dewey that I con·
centrate. That I find this analysis very seriously flawed
shou ld not be taken to indicate anything pro or con about
his general thesis or his analysis of other so-called liberal
thinkers. The general thesis does, however, set the context for the discussion cf Dewey.
The maj or oversight of progressive reform was
a fail ure to lully understand the Implications of
its recognition that every social structure is an
embodiment of a set of values and that the Institutions in which these values are expressed
have a strong influence on determining the
desires and inclinations of the members of a
society. Thus in§tead of a prolonged evaluation
of the principles of social organization itself,
the progressives insisted on evaluating in·
stitutions merely on the basis of their lune·
tional integration."
One would expect to find that Dewey was excepted
from this "the major oversight of progressive reform;" for
if there is anything evident (in the earlier quotes, for exam'.
pie) it is that Dewey did not make the mistake referred to
by Feinberg. But Dewey is precisely the example chosen.
Dewey, he writes,
... merely denied that the social interest was
best served by the business establishment and
proposed that institutions be altered so as to
free technology from its control. His alternative was to change the position of the science
and engineering establishments for that of
[the) business establ ishment assuming perhaps that as the interest of science was served
so too would be that of society. Yet like the
laissez-faire theorist, no criteria other than functional ones were established to judge whether
or not the social interest was being served.''
The criteria of democracy and the concept of idealized
commu nity provide precisely the principles Feinberg says
are lacking. Further, the whole notion of an eli tist
is, as we have seen, repugnant to Dewey. Still,
m~ritocracy
ld write:
Feinberg also cou
Dewey was suggesting as d id Plato before him,
that the intellectual's place was within the
EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
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power struc ture, guiding the political leadership in the governance o f soc iety. Unlike Plato,
however, who felt there were definabl e limits
under which such a ro le should be assumed,
Dewey expressed no limits, and no alterna·
tives.19
Now all of this is sheer error: Dewey flatl y refu sed to
make th e functional arguments supplant his principles.
Dewey's distinctions betw een social democracy (ethical
and moral principles) and political democracy (forms of
governing) Is spelled out most thoroughly in The Problems
of Man, particularly in the last three chapters; but, cu"
iously, this Is a volume to which Feinberg has no reference in Reason and Rhetoric, although he did make use
of it in an earlier article which is partially incorporated In
the book.'0
If one looks more closely at Felnberg's account of
Dewey, he finds some other curious things which deserve
mention. For instance, in two quotations from Dewey,
Feinberg supplies italics without Indicating that he has
done so. In the first c ase, I j udge that the effect is to make
Dewey seem precisely to support fu nctional arrange·
ments rather than democratic principles. On the latter of
these two occasions Feinberg even repeats, apparently
for emphasis, just the passage to which he has added the
italics-emphasis, again not noting the italics are his, not
Dewey's. I quote both passages.
The Deweys' descriptive citation of the Gary
School in Schools of Tomorrow provides some
idea of the techniques that were avai lable for
this purpose.
They (the immigrant parents) are naturally
suspicious of Government and social
authority ... and it is very Important that
their children should have some real
knowledge on which to base a sounder
judgment. Besides giving them thi s, the
schools try to teach American s tandards
of living to the pupils and so their par·
ents. On entering school every pupil
gives the school office, besides the usual
name, age, and address, certain lnfor·
mation about hi s famil
y, Its size, Its re
·
sources, and the character of the ho me
he lives in. This record Is kept in the
school and transferred if the child moves
out of the school district. ... By com·
paring these with any family record, It Is a
simple matter to tell if the famlly are [sic)
living under proper moral and hygienic
conditions.... If bad conditions are due
to ignorance or poverty, the teacher finds
out what can be done to remedy them,
and sees to It that the family learns how
they c an better themselves. If conditions
are very bad, neighborhood public opln·
Ion Is wor1<ed up through the children on
the block.''
The second passage: Dewey reported
.. . it is still possible for a scholar to speak out
on the controversial side of an Issue If he ap·
proaches the problem " in such an objec tive,
historic, and constructive manner as not to ex·
cite the prejudice or inflame the passion even
of those who thoroughly disagree with him."
The intent of the statement Is puzzling since
Winter, 1980
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clearly issues of academic freedom will never
arise if prejudice or passion are not inflamed.
but its effect is to place the burden of proof on
the academic style of the intellec tual di ssenter
even to the point of hold ing him responsible
for the reactions of those " who thoroughly
disagree with him." Presumab ly a passionate
reac tion was to be taken as evidence of some
kind of deficiency in the presentation . After all.
Dewey reminded his readers, the scholar
"needs tact as well as scholarship.""
Further, regarding this last passage, Feinberg does not
note that Dew ey goes on to qualify the importance and
nature of " tact," Dewey saying that " ... ' tact' suggests
perhaps too much a kind of Juggling diplomacy with the
questions at issue."2 l
There is another passage I think one must note,
allhough there are others still." This one seems to
"presume" on Dewey's intentions, however contrary to
his democratic principles. In the c ontext o f a discussion
of Dewey's account ot evaluation and his ethical theory,
Feinberg says,
Part of the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in
its philosophical ambiguity. For not everyo ne
would agree that ethical behavior and evo·
lutionary progress are the same thing or that
the latter should serve as the criterion for the
former. Some would even fine peculiar the
suggestion that our most cherished acts o f
altruism, such as caring for the old are bes t
j udged as preparations for war or other survival
activity. If Dewey were putting lorth on ly a faC·
tual claim, then all that could really be said is
that at certain times in human his tory, there
may be fortunate coincidences between eth ·
ical acts and evolutionary processes. But o f
course this watered down claim did not really
suit his purposes and it was useful for him to
leave the ambiguous quality alone. On the
other hand, to suggest outright that evolu·
tionary survival was to be the criterion for ethl·
cal activity would have been to provide some
clear guidance as to how an ethical claim might
ly
because
be objectively judged. Yet precise
such a criterion can be challenged on o ther
grounds, it was again best for Dew ey to allow
the ambiguity to stand . However, Dewey's
claim does require some analysis."
The passage.s in Dewey that are in question do not in·
dicate to me that Dew ey thought his best purposes would
be served by ambiguity; indeed, this claim about what
Dewey found " useful" and "best" seems merely to
" poison the wells" and prejudge the very analysis which,
it is claimed, is needed.
Three Ploys Illustrated
Now I think that Feinberg 's analysis does illustrate
the three ploys. There is the attack upon Dewey's theory
of democracy, which does not work because of a faulty
statement of that theory. There is the attempt to d iscredit
the practice of Dewey as not genuinely
eral lib
or Clem·
ocratic in a number of instances, a discrediting which does
not seem convincing in the particular cases dealt with
here. Finall
y, there might be the suggestion that Dew·
ey's theory is so confused or ambiguous that It could sup·
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port about any twist and turn which Dewey wished to
make. But, I find this unconvincing.
wtiatever the case, any ploy of revisionism in Dew·
ey's theoretical thought has to start with a clear rec·
ognition of what he fashioned in his mature social and
political thought on democracy. One can refer to Platonic
and Hegelian influences on the early and m iddle·years of
Dewey, but the "bottom line," as youth today are wont to
say, for Dewey resides in the mature, The Public and Its
Problems. Earlier I commented on the fact that one form
of democracy seems to be implicit in his social con·
ception of democracy. I deem It appropriate to quote him
on that form, participatory democracy, as the bottom line
of th is paper. Any charac terizat ion of him as a centralist,
elitist advocate of corporate democracy will be most convincing if it can deal with these words in their context:
The ballot box and majority rule are external
and very largely mechanical symbols and ex·
pressions.
They are expedients, the best
devices that at a certain time have been found,
but beneath them there are the two ideas: Ii rst,
the opportunity, the right and the duty of every
individual to form some conviction and ex·
press some conviction regarding his own place
in the social order, and the relations of that
social order to his own welfare; second, the
fact that each ind ividual counts as one and one
only on an equality with others, so that the final
social will comes about as the cooperative ex·
pression of the ideas of many people. And I
think it is perhaps only recently that we are
real izing that (this) ... idea is the essence of all
sound education."
References
• 1 am deeply indebted to James 0 . Anderson, Clarence J .
Karier. and Ralph Page-most particularly the latter-for nu·
merous helpful comments on all aspects of the article. For
helpful responses of a rather specific but important nature, I am
most grateful to Patricia Amburgy, Jo Ann Boydston. John and
Barbara Colson, Joseph L. OeVitis, Geoffrey Lasky, and Maxine
Greene. These people share in any merit of the article: the s hort·
comings are my own.
'John De\vey, Democracy and Education (Nevi York: Mac ·
millan, 1916), p. 96. Also see pp. 100-102
.
, Ibid ., p. 101.

' Ibid .
•John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Alan
Swallow, 1927), p. 82. Italics are Dewey's.
'Ibid ..• pp. 3(}34, 84·109.
'Ib
id., pp. 207·208.
1
One can see why Oe\vey might be a bane of political
philosophers. They are apt to criticize him for having no developed
theory of pov1er or domination and. hence, no genuine political
philosophy The point, however, is that Dewey has a theory of
social democracy to which, given its nature, political philosophy
is secondary and, in a very real sense, from which it is derivative.
One suspects that they c r iticize him for not having something as
basic (power.domination, etc .) which, in the nature of the case, he
wants to argue is not basic. Probably A.H. Somjee's The Political
Philosophy of John Dewey {New York: Teachers College Press,
1968) is the most understanding of Dewey's basic position from
the pe,spective of a political sclentistfphilosopher. Even Somjee
seems to lament the lack of a completed or fully developed
political philosophy on Dewey's part, how·ever, as tho1:1gh this
were Dewey's object. (Ibid., pp. 138·140, 175-178.) His Chapter 4,
"Dewey's Mature Political Philosophy,"
highly Is
recommended
as background to this article. A lso recqmmended is Wayne A .R.

6

Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

Leys', "Dewey's, Social, Political and Legal Philosophy," in Jo
Ann Boydston (Ed.), Guide to the Works of John Dewey (Carbond~ le, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 55.
pp. 131-1
'Dewey, The Public and Its Problems,
·212.pp. 211
t Ibid., p. 208.

" Ibid., pp. 205·206.
Ibid., p. 207.
·~Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 140.
" Ibid. Italics added.
" Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 146.
" Ibid., p. 149.
•t Walter Feinberg.• Reason and Rhetoric (New York: John
Wiiey and Sons, 1975). Feinberg says in a later work that he i s not
a revisionist, and that his " . .. major concern In examining the
v1orks of John Oev1ey has been to understand the \Vay in v1hich
liberal principles have been molded by the situation In 'Nhich
libe
thinkers have found themselves. In so tar as this has en·
ral
tailed a c riticism of Dewey and o ther liberals, it is for the purpose
of understanding ourselves and our reaction to the present
situation." " On Reading Dewey;" History of Education Quarterly,
4, 4 (Winter, 1975), p. 395. I apologize for the fact that my c riteria
force upon him a label v1hich he v1ould rather not have. See his
discussion in " Revisionist Scholarship and the Problem of
Historical Context," Teachers College Record, 78, 3 (Feb., 1977),
pp. 311-336.
1
• Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 258·259. i Ital cs are
Feinberg's.
"Ibid .. p. 259.
"Ibid., p. 224. Feinberg has correctly pointed out to some of
his critics that he never den ied Dewey's concern for community.
"In one paragraph I wrote about Oev1ey's concern to have people
be abfe 'to recognize
lvesthemse
as members of a community,
each striving to enrich the l ives of all.' And I menlion that Dewey
also believed that if 'the community \Vas to be a democratic one
... its members \vere not to be manipulated from above: '' Fein·
berg, "On Reading Dewey," p . 401. His reference is to p. 495 of his
"Progressive Education and Social Planning," Teachers College
Record, 73, 4 (May, 1972), pp. 486-605. He also notes Dewey's concern i n Reason and Rhetoric. Bot what kind of a concern can he be
saying it is that Oev1ey has, if he is convinced that De\vey e><.·
pressed no limits and no alternatives to t he intellectuals' role in
the power structure? One can take these tv10 contenUonsJ to
paraphrase John Wisdom. to mean that v1hen Oev1ey said he really
believed in democracy and community, he meant that he did not
believe in democracy and community really. For De,vey·s equating
of democracy and community, see the last quotation in Part II,
herein.
to He does not there make the very strong charge, above,
about the role of experts, but he does say: " In the last analysis his
[Dewey's) concern for scientific intelligence is a statement of the
need for experts in a highly complex
ol
tec hn ogical society, and
his appeal for democratic consensus is an attempt to create a
citizenry that is able to see the v1isdom of intelligence expertly
exercised." Or, again:
One factor that separated Progressive educators
from others was an expressed concern for the well·
. being and integrity of Immigrant and racial minori
·
ties. At its best this concern mirrored the appeal fof
diversity that v1as an expliclt part of Dewey's notion
of community. At its worst it expressed the belief in
experts, in authority, and in unity that wa.s hidden in
that same notion of community.
11

Walter Feinberg, "Progressive Education and Social Planning,"
pp. 485 and 496 respectively.
t • Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 209·210. Italics are
Feinberg's. Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use substantially
the same quote, ending v1ith the same sentence (not in italics this
time) In another work. After the quotation they remark: " If any
parent had doubts about the validity of their Instinctive distrust of
public authority, Oev1ey's description of the role of the teacher
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v1ould surely have reassured them that their doubts v1ere firmly
based in reality.'' ;·r eaching for the Welfare State/' in Walter Fein·
berg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Eds.), Work, Technology, and
Education (Urbana, Ill.: University of Ill inoi s Press. 1975), P.. 89. 1do
not think that this Is an obvious conclusion except t hat the
quotation ends where it does: had the paragraph in v1hich it ap·
pears been concluded, the readerv1ould have further read that:
From time to time an auditorium period is devoted to
show ing these maps and poi nting out the good and
bad features of the block s and neighborhoods.
Children always carry the news home to their parents,
and as rents and accommodation are freely dis·
cussed, these reports are often acted upon. The
parents are encouraged to come to the school and
ask tor information, and on more than one occasion
some newly arrived family has moved from an over·
cro\vded rear shack to a comfortable flat with the
same rent because through the children they found
out that their bad quarters v1ere unnecessary.
Because the school does this work to help, and as
part of Its regular program. it is accepted by the
children and thei r parents as a matter of course. In·
formation about improvements. s anitation. the s ize
and comfort of the houses, and the rents, is given to
the parents. If a block is poor a good block nearby
\Vhere cond itions are better and the rents the same,
is shown them. Thus the schools not only teach the
theory of good citizenship and social conditions, they
give the chiren
ld l actua facts and condi tions, so that
they can see v1hat is v1tong and how It can be bet·
tered.
The complete paragraph appears In John and Evelyn ,Dewey
Schools of Tomotrow, " Introduction" by Wi llia
m Wo lfgang Brick·
man (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1962). pp. 147-148.
n Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 228·229. Feinberg's
i talics.
n The exact sentence reads: " We may insis t thal a man
needs tact as v1ell as scholarshi p; or, let us say, sympathy with
human interests -since 'tact' suggests perhaps too much a k ind
of juggling d iplomacy with the questions at issue." F rom John
Dewey, "Academic Freedom," In Jo Ann Boydston (Ed.), John
Dewey, The Middle Works: 1902·1903 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern
Ill inois University Press, 1976), Vol. 2, p. 60.
>' One of these is Feinberg's response to a passage i n
Dewey's Impressions of Soviet Russia. Feinberg quotes Dewey as
follov1s:
Nowhere else in the \VOrld is employment of it (pro·
paganda) as a tool of control so constant, consis·
tent, and systematic as in Russia at present. In·
deed, It has taken on such importance and social
dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in
another social medium. the c orrect meaning. For we
instinctively associate propaganda with the ac·
complishing of some specific ends, more or less
private to a particular class or group and correspond·
ingl
from others. But i n Russia the
y concealed
propaganda is In behalf of a burni ng public faith. One
may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in
the object of thei r faith, but their sincerity is beyond
question. To them the end for ·which propaganda is
employed is not a private or even a c lass gain, but is
the universal good of universal humanity. In con·
sequence propaganda is education and education Is
propaganda. They are more than confounded; t hey
cal.
are Identi
Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 207·208. Feinberg t hen says
George S. Counts " expressed a similar sentiment a few years
later.'' and quotes Counts to the effect that, if progressive
education is to "emancipate itself," it must " become less
frightened t han it is today at the bogeys o f imposition and in·
doctrlnallon." Feinberg then remarks that " The appeal that the
early phases of the Soviet experi ment held for these educators
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was as much an indication of their essentially managerial
l
philosophy as it was an expression of their ideas on socia
justice." Ibid ., p. 208.
I am i ndebted to Paul C. Violas for pointi ng out that Feinberg
errs in quoting Dewey to the effect that "They (education and
propaganda) are more than confounded; they are identical."
De\vey uses the term " identified
,"
not "identical," \Vhlch would
make for a weaker case. De\vey easily could hold that the
Russians could incorrectly make an identificatio n even i f the tv10
are not identica
l.
John Dewey, Impressions of Soviet Russia (Ne\v
York: The Nevi Republic, Inc., 1929}, p. 54. This and another
passage in Dewey's work (Ibid., pp. 81-82.) deserve more extended
treatment than I can give them here.
Soviet education at the community level did appeal to Dewey
for a period of time. although even initially he d istrusted Soviet
ideology and was not certain aboufv1hat might happen when the
t ly to bear on communal practices. Ibid.,
ideology came more direc
pp. 57·58, 113
· ·123,
114, 120
127. The appeal is one thing; but,
agai n, it i s quite another to const,ue the quoted passage as
saying that Dewey \vanted or though t desirable an identi fication
of education and propaganda. It hardly v1ould be consistent \vi th
his other statements on education to say that its identi fication
with propaganda, " had appeal." See, for example, John Dewey,
Character and Events, ed. bY Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry
587·
591, 776-781; and his The
Holt, 1929), Vol. 11, pp. 517·521,
l
Library, 1946, pp. 37.
Problems of Men (New York: Philosophica
38, 56, 82.
Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use the same quotation
{with the same errof) in another work, introducing the quotation
with: "Oev1ey's essentially laudatory description o f Soviet
education is perhaps Indicative o f his more general attitude about
s ocial control.
"
At least equally, " IPerhaps not," think we can
reply. Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., Work, Tech·
nology, and Education, p. 74.
O ne other point must suffice for this brief paper. Feinberg
w rites:
One of the schools that Oev1ey reported on in the lat·
ter part of the book (Schools of Tomorrow) was
P.S. 26 in Indianapolis. P.S. 26 was an all·black school
i n a poor black s lum. In vie\v of the condition of
the families in the neighborhood and the poverty
that Dewey described. the school \Vas carryi ng on
some v1orthwhile programs and \vaS rightly
luded.
inc
Oev1ey mentioned that the sc ho
o l was located i n ·' the
crov
1ded distric t o f the c ity and has only colored
pupils /' and he observed t hat the school was not at·
tempting to solve the race problem but that i t v1as
developi ng good citiiens. If the experiment were to
succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in
solving the race problem." Yet the program that
Dewey then described v1as strictly a vocational
, aprogram lbeit an excellent one v1here much of the
school and the neighborhood served as a s hop for the
students. At a time \'/hen much black labor was un·
skilled or employe-d as farmhands, a program of skill
development v1as an advance torv1ard. Nevertheless.
black boys learned how to cook and black girls how
to sew.
It mighl be said in the context of the purpose of the
Deweys' book that it is unfair to cr iticize Oe\vey for
merely reporting on \Vhat ~·as a splendid vocat
ional
program wi thout commenting on the social con·
ditions that made being a cook one of the highest
aspirations of a Negro child. Yet in vie~· of the
some\vhat m ild, but nevertheless serious, criticism
[that the Oe\veys made elsewhere in School and
Society) of Montessori, It v1ould not have been too
much to expect a comment on t he implications of a
strictly vocational program for black childr
en. A more
serious shadov1 Is cast over Dewey's evaluation of
the exper iment as he suggests Its greatest value to
lie among the youngsters of Negro and immigrant
parents. If it was real ism that guided Oev1ey's at·
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titude, it \Vas realism of a peculiar kind. one that
believed that the bes t way for a black man to cope
wi1h American society v1as to fit into it as best he
could and as best it would
d.,. allov1 Ibi p. 110.
Let us look at the lar
ger section from Schools of Tomorrow. I have
added italics.
The supervising principal of public school No. 26 in
Indianapolis is trying an experiment unlike any other
knov1n to us in an effort to make his plant a true
school; that is, a place where the children of his
neighborhood shall become healthy, happy, and com·
petent both economically and socially, and where the
connection of instruction v1i th the life of the com·
munity shall be directlycogni
re
zed both by children
and parents. Mr. Valetine•s school is locate
d in the
ed color
distric t of the city and has
poor, crov1ded,
.
only colored
pupils It is not an attempt to solve the
"race questio
n"
nor yet an experiment suited only to
corored people. There is nothing in the school not en.
tirely practical In any district where the children
come from homes with limited rosources and meager
surroundings. A visitor, when leaving his school, can·
not fail to wish that such ventures might be started Jn
all our great cities-indeed in any community where
people need to be aroused to a sense of their needs,
including the fact that it they are to contribute to the
best interests of the community, they must be taught
how to earn a living, and how to use their resources
for th$mselves and their neighbors both in leisure
ls school a
time and in working hours. Mr. Valentine's
edcolor Chi
only in the sense that the
school
ldren
for
work has been arranged in relation to the conditions
of the neighborhood; these modify the needs of the
ildren
ch
v1ho are the pupils. Yet the sucparticular
cess of the exper iment would mean a real step tor\Vard to solving the "race question" and pecul iar
problems of any immigrant d istrict as well. Mr. Valentine is not Interested in illustrating any theories on
these points, but i n mak ing up for gaps i n the home
life of the pupils; giving them opportunities to
prepare for a better fut ure~ in supplying plenty of
healthy occupation and recreation; and in seeing to it
that their schoolwork reacts at once to improve
neighborhood condi tions.
ally
sch
ool Is
re
a social settlement
Mr. Valentine's
for the neighborhood, but it has a decided advantage
over the average settlement, for it comes in contact
v1ith all the chi ldren living within its district for a num·
ber of hours each day,lewhi most settlements reach
the children for only a fe\v scattered hours each
week. The school has a larger influence than most
settlements because it is a public institution tor
v1hich the people \vho use it are paying their -share:
they feel that their relation to it is a busi ness one.
not a matter of philanthropy. Because of this busi·

nessl!ke relation the school is able really to teach
the doctrines of social welfare. In any setllement the
\vork is al\vays handicapped by the fact t hat the
people who make use of It feel that they are receiving
something for \Vhich they do not pay, that something
is being done for them by people who are better off
financially than they are. But 9 ivin9 a community
facilities that it lacks for special classes and rec·
reation through the publ ic school of the dlsttict
put the \VOrk on a different basis. The school is really
the property of the people o f the district: they feel
that they are more or less responsible for what is
done there. Any wider activities that a school may un·
dertake are, to a cerlain extent, the \vork of the
people themeselves; they are simply making use of
the school plant for their own needs.
John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, pp. t5H52. My
italics. (Feinberg•s reference is top. 207 of this work, v1hich I think
must be Incorrect.) One can say that Dewey refers ~pec iall y to
youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents; but is i t not equally
or more correct to say that he refers especially to "any district
w here the children come from ho1nes w ith limited resources and
meager surroundings"? And, does the fuller passage indicate that
Dewey is unmoved by a deep concern for all such children?
I venture that Feinberg•s account does not do justice to v1hat
Dewey's account and context provide. And I single out the
passage for lengthy treatment because Feinberg, in four other publications. uses the passage in an almost identical manner. with
even Jess context (although v1ith reference back to Reason and
Rhetoric) in at least three of them. See his "Progressive Education
and Social Planning," pp. 495·496; Feinberg and Henry Rosemont,
Jr.1 Work, Technology, and Education, p. 90; Feinberg's revie\V,
"John Dewey: Lectures In China, t919·192o;·
hed publis
in
Philosophy East and West, XXV, 4 (Winter 1975), p. 368; and his
"Educational Equality Under Two Confl icting Models o f Educa·
tional Development," Theory and Society, 2, 2 (Summer, 1975),
p. 209, ftn. 17.
The f inal chapter i n the Oeweys' Schools of Tomorrow (Chap·
ter XI. ··Democracy and Education" ) makes it patently clear that
they are not in any sense advocating or accepting c lass or racist
education from the purvi.!w of democracy. Silent (perhaps overly
" tactful") they are about speci fic situations which would gall or in·
furiate us today, but they do not equivocate on democratic prin·
ciples. Perhaps this Is an appropriate place to give one of the
more moving statements of \Vhat democratic principles required
for all children: "What the best and wi sest parent wants for his
O\Vn child, that must the community v1ant for all o f its children.
Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted
upon. it destroys our democracy:· John Dewey, The Child and the
Curriculum and The School and Society, with " Introduct
ion" by
Leonard Garmlchael (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, t956), p. 7.

l

n Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 52·53.
u Dewey, The Problems of Men, p, 36.
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